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Abstract 
This article examines the future role of energy efficiency as a resource in the Western 
United States and Canada, as envisioned in the most recent resource plans issued by 16 utilities, 
representing about 60% of the region’s load. Utility and third-party administered energy 
efficiency programs proposed by 15 utilities over a ten-year horizon would save almost 19,000 
GWh annually, about 5.2% of forecast load. There are clear regional trends in the aggressiveness 
of proposed energy savings. California’s investor-owned utilities (IOUs) had the most aggressive 
savings targets, followed by IOUs in the Pacific Northwest, and the lowest savings were 
proposed by utilities in Inland West states and by two public utilities on the West coast. The 
adoption of multiple, aggressive policies targeting energy efficiency and climate change appear 
to produce sizeable energy efficiency commitments. Certain specific policies, such as mandated 
energy savings goals for California’s IOUs and energy efficiency provisions in Nevada’s 
Renewable Portfolio Standard had a direct impact on the level of energy savings included in the 
resource plans. Other policies, such as revenue decoupling and shareholder incentives, and 
voluntary or legislatively mandated greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, may have also 
impacted utilities’ energy efficiency commitments, though the effects of these policies are not 
easily measured. Despite progress among the utilities in our sample, more aggressive energy 
efficiency strategies that include high-efficiency standards for additional appliances and 
equipment, tighter building codes for new construction and renovation, as well as more 
comprehensive ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs are likely to be necessary to 
achieve a region-wide goal of meeting 20% of electricity demand with efficiency in 2020.  
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1. Introduction 
Throughout North America, energy efficiency is generating unprecedented interest, and 
policymakers are exploring options for prioritizing efficiency in resource investment decisions. 
Several factors are driving this trend, including: the perception that energy efficiency is a 
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relatively low-cost, environmentally benign resource; rapidly escalating capital costs of new 
generation resources; difficulties siting new power plants and major transmission facilities; 
significant increases in fuel costs for natural gas-fired generation plants; and the prospect of 
future greenhouse gas (GHG) emission regulations. 
Electricity market structures vary by state and province in North America, with 
corresponding differences in the approaches to funding investments in energy efficiency. Most 
states in the northeast and mid-Atlantic regions of the United States (U.S.) and some Eastern 
Canadian provinces have restructured electricity markets, consisting of competitive retail 
suppliers and organized wholesale markets operated by Independent System Operators (ISOs) or 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Public benefit charges are a primary mechanism 
for supporting energy efficiency in these states, whereby a non-bypassable charge is levied on 
ratepayers to fund energy efficiency programs administered by utilities or other entities. In 
addition, ISOs/RTOs have increasingly focused on designing wholesale markets that enable 
participation by demand-side resources, and two ISOs/RTOs (ISO-New England and PJM) have 
recently developed capacity markets in which energy efficiency resources are allowed to 
compete head-to-head with generation to meet long-term capacity requirements.  
In the Western U.S. and Canada, organized wholesale markets are the exception rather 
than the rule: only California and Alberta have ISOs. In most of the West, investor-owned 
utilities are vertically integrated and subject to rate-of-return regulation, and public utilities and 
power authorities play a large role. In recent years, the West has seen a renewed emphasis on 
long-term resource planning by electric (and gas) utilities, partly in response to the Western 
energy crisis of 2000-01 and concomitant price shocks.1 Other drivers for the resurgent interest 
in long-term resource planning include high electricity demand growth, resource adequacy 
concerns, rapid increases in natural gas prices, and environmental concerns. 
Long-term resource planning provides a framework to guide utility resource acquisition 
decisions and a benchmark for regulators tasked with ensuring the prudence of these decisions. 
Utilities that engage in resource planning typically repeat the exercise periodically, issuing a new 
plan every 2–5 years. Although specific practices differ, resource plans typically include several 
common elements: utilities forecast future loads (typically over a 10-to-20 year time horizon), 
assess their expected load and resource balance, evaluate a set of candidate resource portfolios to 
meet projected shortfalls, analyze resource and price uncertainty and the relative risk of 
alternative resource strategies, and select a “preferred” portfolio based on the results of their 
analysis. Though the preferred portfolio typically extends over a 10-to-20 year period, utility 
resource plans often also contain a shorter-term (e.g., 3–5 year) action plan to initiate 
procurement of resources in line with the preferred portfolio. Typically, the utility’s public utility 
commission (PUC) or other regulating body will review the utility’s resource plan, often 
providing an opportunity for public comment. In some cases, regulators may “approve” the 
particular resources proposed by utilities in their resource plan, though generally the regulatory 
review is limited to simply determining whether the plan meets established standards regarding 
content, structure, and methodology. 
                                                 
1
 Most Western states had adopted Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) rules during the 1980s to encourage, and in 
some cases require, utilities to include demand-side as well as supply-side resources in their resource planning, and 
to ensure that least-cost resources were chosen. With electric industry restructuring in the 1990s, a number of states 
and utilities in the West (e.g. Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Colorado, California) consciously de-emphasized long-
term resource planning. 
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Long-term resource planning can facilitate utility investments in energy efficiency, by 
providing a relatively transparent framework within which utilities, state regulators, and other 
stakeholders can compare the relative cost-effectiveness and environmental impacts of supply- 
and demand-side resources. In addition, Western states and provinces have adopted a wide range 
of additional policies that directly or indirectly promote energy efficiency, such as: efficiency 
standards for appliances, equipment and new construction; tax credits; and policies to promote 
performance contracting in public institutional facilities. 
This article examines the future role of energy efficiency as a resource in the Western 
U.S. and Canada, as envisioned in the most recent resource plans issued by 16 of the region’s 
electric utilities. We compare the projected savings from ratepayer-funded energy efficiency 
programs included within the preferred resource portfolios proposed in utilities’ plans, and we 
attempt to link these results to state/provincial energy efficiency and climate change policies and 
other potential drivers of energy efficiency. In many cases, utility resource plans represent the 
only publicly available source of information on projected levels of utility-sponsored energy 
efficiency over periods greater than 2–5 years.2 We demonstrate how this information can be 
used for region-wide assessments, using the energy efficiency resource acquisitions proposed in 
the 16 reviewed resource plans as a starting point to track progress toward the goal, adopted by 
the Western Governors’ Association (WGA), of reducing energy use throughout the Western 
U.S. by 20% in 2020. 
 
2. Data Sources and Assumptions 
For this study, we reviewed the most recent publicly available utility resource plans in the 
Western U.S. and Canada. The utilities are listed in Table 1. We divided them among three 
regions with distinct climactic, resource-mix, and planning characteristics: California, the Pacific 
Northwest, and the Inland West. We include BC Hydro in the Pacific Northwest group because it 
shares a similar climate and hydroelectric-based electric system with this region. Most of the 
utilities are investor-owned, with the following exceptions: the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power (LADWP) and Seattle City Light are public municipal utilities; Tri-state is a 
generation and transmission cooperative; and BC Hydro is a provincial Crown corporation. The 
utilities in Table 1 represent about 62% of the load in the Western Interconnection overseen by 
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC, 2005).3 
To compare utilities’ projected levels of energy efficiency savings, we developed several 
metrics that involve scaling energy efficiency savings to utility retail sales. Although most of the 
utilities evaluated a range of possible resource portfolios, we used data from each utility’s 
“preferred” or “adopted” portfolio for this study. Similarly, where utilities reported more than 
one load forecast, we used the “base case” or “most likely” scenario. Several utilities did not 
report load forecast data for all years of their resource plans. Where necessary, we interpolated or 
extrapolated missing load forecast data using growth rate trends calculated from the data that 
were provided. 
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 Utilities also file energy efficiency program plans in which they seek regulatory approval to implement specific 
programs over periods of typically one to three years. 
3
 The WECC control area roughly includes the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New 
Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and 
Alberta, although it is not precisely bounded by state lines, and it also extends into Mexico. 
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Table 1. Utility Resource Plans Included in this Study 
Utility Primary Location Year of 
resource plan 
Timeframe of 
resource plan 
CALIFORNIA    
Los Angeles Department of Water & Power 
(LADWP) 
California 2006 2006-2025 
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) California 2006 2007-2016 
Southern California Edison (SCE) California 2006 2007-2016 
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) California 2006 2007-2016 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST1    
Avista Idaho, Washington 2007 2008-2027 
BC Hydro1 British Columbia 2006 2006-2025 
Portland General Electric (PGE) Oregon 2007 2008-2012 
Puget Sound Energy (PSE) Washington 2007 2008-2027 
Seattle City Light Washington 2006 2007-2026 
INLAND WEST    
Idaho Power Idaho 2006 2006-2025 
Nevada Power Nevada 2006 2007-2026 
NorthWestern Energy Montana 2007 2008-2027 
PacifiCorp2 Oregon, Idaho, Utah, California, 
Washington, Wyoming 
2007 2007-2016 
Public Service of Colorado/Xcel Energy (PSCo) Colorado 2007 2008-2020 
Sierra Pacific Nevada 2007 2008-2027 
Tri-State Generation & Transmission Association Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, 
Nebraska 
2007 2007-2025 
1We include the Canadian province of British Columbia in the Pacific Northwest region as it shares a similar climate and a 
hydroelectric-based electric system.  
2PacifiCorp’s service territory includes both Pacific Northwest and Inland West states, as well as California. We classify it as an 
Inland West utility because its most (>60%) of its retail sales are in this region. 
 
Given that the resource plans’ start-dates and timeframes vary (see Table 1), we 
calculated and report most of the results in this paper using data for the first five years and the 
first ten years of each plan. The exception is in section 5, where we examined projected energy 
efficiency savings over the period from 2006 to 2020, in order to compare the utilities’ aggregate 
energy efficiency projections to the WGA’s West-wide energy efficiency goal. To conduct this 
analysis, we made two assumptions. First, for utilities’ whose resource plans did not include 
energy efficiency proposals through 2020, we assumed their programs would continue to 
produce incremental annual savings at same level as the last year provided in the plan until 2020. 
Second, for utilities whose plan start-dates were later than 2006, we used data on energy 
efficiency proposals obtained from previous resource plans to fill in the early years. 
 
3. Energy efficiency proposed in the resource plans 
All of the resource plans included future ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs in 
their preferred portfolios. Figure 1 compares the size of these resources, expressed as Gigawatt-
hours (GWh) of annual energy savings from programs proposed for implementation during the 
first five and ten years of each utility’s resource plan.4 The five-year results represent a mid-term 
horizon, reflecting existing energy efficiency programs that the utility plans to continue, as well 
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 These projections reflect savings only from programs implemented over each utility’s planning period, and exclude 
savings that persist from programs implemented in prior years. 
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as new or expanded programs that are under development and are likely to be authorized by 
regulators. The ten-year horizon reflects a longer-term, somewhat more speculative outlook as 
utility energy efficiency program funding is not typically authorized for more than two or three 
years at a time.5  
The combined five-year targets of the 16 utilities add to over 9,500 GWh of annual 
savings. After ten years, the 15 utilities (omitting Portland Gas and Electric (PGE), whose plan 
did not extend to ten years) propose almost 19,000 GWh of combined annual savings. The 
highest targets are for Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), BC 
Hydro, and PacifiCorp, in part reflecting the fact that these are, by far, the largest utilities in our 
sample. Virtually all of the utilities have signficantly expanded their energy efficiency proposals 
compared to previous plans, which were reported by Hopper et al. (2006). 
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Figure 1. Energy Saving Effects of Proposed Energy Efficiency Programs 
 
We also report utilities’ energy efficiency program proposals as proportions of their 
forecast energy demand and energy demand growth in Table 2. We define energy demand as 
total energy requirements (TER). TER represents the amount of load that would have to be 
served with supply-side resources if no energy efficiency strategies were implemented during the 
forecast period.6 
The first metric in Table 2—energy savings as a percentage of forecast load—reveals the 
share of TER proposed to be met with energy efficiency, and normalizes the energy efficiency 
proposals for the size of the utility. In aggregate, the 16 utilities propose to meet about 3% of 
                                                 
5
 Only about half of the resource plans forecast farther than ten years into the future, limiting our ability to report 
data across utilities over longer planning horizons (e.g. 20 years), which would be more useful for fully assessing the 
impact of carbon policies and various mitigation strategies. 
6
 In practice, most of the utilities in our sample did not elaborate on their treatment of efficiency in their load 
forecasts, and it is unclear to what degree past and future energy savings from naturally occurring efficiency, 
standards and codes are accounted for in the reported load forecasts. In the absence of such clarification, we made 
the assumption that the forecasts as given represent TER, but we acknowledge that this may introduce bias to the 
results in Table 2. 
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their combined load with efficiency after five years, and 5% after ten years (the latter figure does 
not include PGE, for which ten-year data are not available). 
 
Table 2. Energy Savings Metrics 
Utility First Five Years of Plan  First Ten Years of Plan 
 Energy savings 
(% of 5th-year 
TER1) 
Energy savings 
(% of growth in 
TER1 over 1st five 
years) 
 Energy savings 
(% of 10th year 
TER1) 
Energy savings 
(% of growth in 
TER1 over 1st ten 
years) 
CALIFORNIA      
LADWP 2.7% 36%  5.7% 46% 
PG&E 5.4% 84%  9.3% 73% 
SCE 5.4% 50%  8.5% 44% 
SDG&E 7.3% 56%  11.4% 50% 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST     
Avista 3.4% 22%  7.1% 30% 
BC Hydro 2.8% 32%  7.7% 53% 
PGE 4.3% 40%  ——  —— 
PSE 5.8% 77%  11.1% 71% 
Seattle City Light 3.0% 52%  5.5% 49% 
INLAND WEST      
Idaho Power 3.1% 34%  5.1% 31% 
Nevada Power 2.3% 14%  3.7% 16% 
NorthWestern 3.2% 52%  6.1% 50% 
PacifiCorp 3.0% 19%  5.3% 22% 
PSCo 2.9% 32%  5.7% 32% 
Sierra Pacific 2.5% 23%  4.3% 24% 
Tri-State 1.9% 8%  3.6% 12% 
      
Load-weighted 
Average 
2.9% 26%  5.2% 31% 
1TER(Total Energy Requirements) = forecasted energy demand, not accounting for the effects of energy efficiency programs 
proposed for implementation over the planning period. 
 
There are clear differences among regions, with the largest resource contributions 
proposed by the California investor-owned utilities (8.5% to over 11% of forecast load after ten 
years). Puget Sound Electric (PSE) is also in this range, planning to meet over 11% of its load 
with energy efficiency after ten years. Most of the other Pacific Northwest utilities have more 
moderate ten-year proposals at just over 7% of load. The least aggressive proposals are among 
the Inland West utilities, in the 4–6% range. The two coastal municipal utilities, Seattle City 
Light and LADWP, proposed efficiency resources similar to the Inland West utilities. 
The second metric in Table 2—energy savings as a percentage of forecast load growth—
demonstrates the degree to which utilities are planning to meet expected demand growth with 
efficiency. In aggregate, the 16 utilities are proposing to meet about 26% of their combined 
demand growth over the first five years of their plans with energy efficiency, and 31% after ten 
years. Savings from individual utilities’ proposed efficiency activities range from 12% to over 
70% of load growth after ten years. 
Load growth is a significant issue for utilities in Western North America, and energy 
efficiency is often viewed through the lens of growth mitigation. We compare the utilities’ 
forecast average annual load growth, with and without their proposed energy efficiency 
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activities, over the first ten years of their plans in Figure 2. In California, energy efficiency is 
expected to reduce load growth by over 70% for PG&E, and 40- 50% for the other utilities. In 
the Pacific Northwest, energy savings can be expected to reduce average annual load growth by 
70% for PSE, by about half for BC Hydro and Seattle City Light, and by roughly one quarter for 
Avista. Among the Inland West utilities, the impact on load growth rates is more modest, with 
reductions of up to one third. 
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Figure 2. Impact of Energy Efficiency Programs on Forecast Energy Load Growth: Ten-Year 
Timeframe 
 
4. Policy and market drivers of energy efficiency 
What explains the differences in proposed levels of energy efficiency among the utilities 
in this study? Clearly there are regional trends: California leads with the most aggressive 
proposals, followed by the Pacific Northwest, and the lowest savings levels are observed among 
the Inland West utilities. Utility ownership structure also appears to be impactful: the major 
exception to the geographic trend is the coastal municipal utilities—LADWP and Seattle City 
Light—whose proposals resemble the Inland West utilities’; and the lowest targets among all the 
plans were proposed by Tri-State, a wholesale cooperative. Utility experience administering and 
implementing energy efficiency programs and/or the maturity of the programs themselves may 
also affect the extent to which senior utility managers are comfortable proposing future 
aggressive energy efficiency goals.7 
We postulate that a number of policies and other market drivers underlie these trends. 
Despite the absence of a federal climate policy in the U.S., there is growing activity at the state 
and regional level to establish policies to promote energy efficiency as a high priority resource, 
                                                 
7
 For example, in Nevada, utilities effectively stopped offering energy efficiency programs during the mid-1990s 
and many of their energy efficiency staff were re-assigned or moved on. These utilities are in the process of ramping 
up new programs and have to rebuild their portfolios and train new energy efficiency program staff.  
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and to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Some of these policies are all-encompassing, and 
others apply only to investor-owned—not municipal or cooperative—utilities.  
In Table 3, we rank the utilities in our study in terms of the aggressiveness of their 
proposed energy efficiency activities, and we indicate the various types of state/provincial 
policies to encourage energy efficiency or climate change mitigation, as well as other market 
drivers, to which they are subject. In terms of simple numbers of policies and drivers, the 
California investor-owned utilities stand out—PG&E, SCE and SDG&E’s proposed energy 
efficiency activities are among the top four most aggressive, and these utilities are subject to the 
most factors in Table 3, reflecting an aggressive policy initiative in California to make energy 
efficiency the highest priority resource. But this example aside, the number of policies and 
drivers in Table 3 does not have an obvious link to the amount of energy efficiency proposed in 
the resource plans. For example, only one factor applies to Northwestern, yet it is ranked in the 
middle third of utilities, while several utilities in the bottom third have 3 or 4 factors. 
Obviously, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the impact of all the 
policies and market drivers on utility preference for energy efficiency in their resource plans. We 
will not attempt to do so. Instead, we discuss each in turn, providing where appropriate specific 
examples of how a given policy or driver impacted the level of energy efficiency considered or 
proposed in utility resource plans. 
 
Table 3. Drivers of Energy Efficiency among Utilities in the West 
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Savings from proposed energy efficiency 
programs after 1st ten years of plan 
(% of forecast load) 
11.4 11.1 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.5 7.1 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.6 
Energy efficiency policies                 
Mandate to pursue all cost-effective energy 
efficiency 
X X X X   X 
(WA) 
   X      
EEPS or RPS with energy efficiency set-aside4          X    X X  
Revenue decoupling X  X X         X    
Shareholder incentives X X X X    X  X   X X X  
Climate change policies                 
State/province-wide carbon emission reduction 
goals 
X X X X X X X 
(WA) 
 X X X X    X 
(CO, 
NM) 
Generation carbon emission performance 
standards 
X X X X X  X 
(WA) 
 X  X X 
(WA, 
CA) 
    
Carbon emission mitigation requirements  X    X X 
(WA) 
   X X 
(WA, 
OR) 
    
GHG emission cost adder X X X X   X   X  X X    
Other market drivers                 
High forecast load growth (>2%/year) X   X  X X     X   X X 
High retail electric rates (>20% above the U.S. 
national average)5 
X  X X          X   
1PGE only proposed energy efficiency programs for five years; the value shown was calculated assuming the programs would 
continue for an additional five years at the same level as the last year proposed. 
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2Where specified, drivers apply only for the portion of the utility’s service territory in the states indicated. 
3LADWP, a public municipal utility, was not subject to California’s energy-efficiency mandate at the time its resource plan was 
issued. Going forward, a similar law will apply to municipal utilities.  
4EEPS=Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard; RPS=Renewable Portfolio Standard 
5Source: United States Energy Information Administration, Form-861 (2006). 
 
4.1 Energy efficiency policies 
A number of jurisdictions in the West have implemented policies designed to directly 
encourage or mandate utility investment in energy efficiency, which are discussed below. 
 
4.1.1 Mandates to pursue cost-effective energy efficiency 
The states of California and Washington have adopted mandates requiring their investor-
owned utilities to identify and pursue all achievable cost-effective energy efficiency before 
considering investment in new generation options.8 
California’s mandate takes the form of a “loading order” policy, codified by statute, 
requiring the state’s utilities’ procurement plans to “include a showing that the electrical 
corporation will first meet its unmet resource needs through all available energy efficiency and 
demand reduction resources that are cost effective, reliable, and feasible” (SB 1037, 2005). The 
loading order policy puts energy efficiency first because it is believed to be the lowest-cost, 
environmentally preferred resource.  
To implement this policy, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) adopted 
long-term energy efficiency goals for the state’s investor-owned utilities (CPUC, 2004), drawing 
in part from the results of a study that estimated the achievable cost-effective energy efficiency 
potential in the three utilities’ service territories (Rufo and Coito, 2002). This policy had a direct 
impact on the amount of energy efficiency proposed in PG&E, SCE and SDG&E’s resource 
plans, and their proposals closely match the CPUC goals. While several additional supporting 
policies and factors are in place to encourage and eliminate barriers to California’s investor-
owned utilities pursuing energy efficiency, it was the annual energy savings goals set forth by the 
CPUC, and the underlying statutory mandate for utilities to acquire all achievable cost-effective 
energy efficiency, that drove the specific levels of energy efficiency proposed in these utilities’ 
resource plans.  
In Washington, voters passed a ballot initiative in 2006 requiring the state’s large utilities 
to “pursue all available conservation that is cost-effective, reliable, and feasible” (VI 937, 2006, 
Sec. 4). Accordingly, each of the Washington utilities—PSE, Avista, and Seattle City Light—
developed energy efficiency savings targets for their resource plans based on their current 
estimates of the maximum achievable energy efficiency potential in their service territories. 
 
4.1.2 Energy efficiency portfolio standards and renewable portfolio standards with efficiency 
set-asides 
Two states in the western U.S. have enacted portfolio standards, either specifically for 
energy efficiency or for a broader class of resources that includes energy efficiency.  
Colorado has an energy efficiency portfolio standard (EEPS) requiring Public Service of 
Colorado (PSCo) to achieve energy savings equivalent to 5% of its 2006 retail sales and peak 
demand by 2018 (HB 07-1037, 2007, Sec. 40-3.2-104(2)). PSCo developed the proposed energy 
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 Washington’s mandate applies to both investor-owned and public utilities with more than 25,000 customers. 
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efficiency activity in its resource plan based on its estimation of the full achievable potential in 
its service territory, which turned out to be greater than the EEPS requirement. In this case, the 
state policy effectively set a floor on energy efficiency investment. Carbon emission reduction 
goals in Colorado (discussed below) appear to have played a more direct role in determining the 
level of energy efficiency proposed by PSCo. 
Nevada has a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which requires utilities to meet 20% of 
their energy requirements with renewable energy sources by 2015, but allows them to meet up to 
25% of this target with energy efficiency (Nevada AB 3, 2005, Sec. 29). Based on their 
assessment that this portion of their RPS target can be met more cost-effectively with energy 
efficiency programs than with renewable energy projects, the Nevada utilities included energy 
efficiency targets in their resource plans equal to the maximum amount of efficiency allowed for 
RPS compliance. As neither Nevada Power nor Sierra Pacific attempted to evaluate whether 
additional energy efficiency would be cost-effective, the RPS appears to be effectively driving 
proposed investment levels in energy efficiency programs in Nevada. Thus, unlike PSCo, the 
Nevada utilities appear to treat their portfolio standard as a cap, rather than a floor, on the 
amount of energy efficiency they pursue. 
 
4.1.3 Strategies to overcome utility financial disincentives to energy efficiency: revenue 
decoupling and shareholder incentive mechanisms 
Utility spending on energy efficiency can affect the utility’s financial position: (1) 
through the impact on utility earnings of reduced sales; and (2) through the effects on 
shareholder value of energy efficiency spending versus investment in supply-side resources 
(Jensen, 2007). In the first case, energy efficiency directly reduces utility revenues by decreasing 
electric sales. The impact on shareholder value is linked to how rates are typically set. Utilities 
incur both fixed costs, which do not vary as a function of short-run changes in sales, and variable 
costs, which do. In most states, regulators direct utilities to recover a portion of their fixed costs, 
which include a return on capital, through volumetric rates (i.e., $/kWh usage charges). If the 
utility effectively implements energy efficiency programs and actual sales are lower than forecast 
when prices were set, the utility will under-recover its fixed costs. 
Revenue decoupling is one method to address utility disincentives to pursue energy 
efficiency. Decoupling separates revenue and profits from the volume of electricity sales, and 
conceptually should make the utility indifferent to sales fluctuations. In practice, decoupling 
involves setting revenue targets that are independent of sales, and then truing up retail rates 
periodically to meet them in the face of any fluctuations. As a result, the utility’s revenues 
between rate cases are not affected by reduced sales resulting from energy efficiency programs 
(or, depending on the design of the decoupling mechanism, other factors such as weather or 
economic growth). Among the jurisdictions in our study, the states of California and Idaho have 
adopted decoupling mechanisms for their electric utilities. 
Although revenue decoupling can remove utilities’ short-term financial disincentives to 
pursuing energy efficiency, it does not provide a positive financial incentive to invest in 
efficiency. Utility shareholders stand to gain more from constructing new generating capacity—
physical assets on which they earn a rate of return—than from less tangible “negawatts” for 
which they receive cost recovery as an expense item, but no additional earnings. To address this 
issue, a number of jurisdictions have adopted strategies that allow utilities the opportunity to earn 
financial incentives for exemplary performance in cost-effectively delivering energy efficiency 
resources. The policy goal is to align utility financial interests with the regulator’s established 
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goals for successful delivery of energy efficiency. These incentive mechanisms can take a variety 
of forms, including: capitalizing energy efficiency program spending, allowing utilities to earn a 
rate of return on the “regulatory asset”; shared savings schemes, whereby utilities may keep a 
portion of the net benefits from energy efficiency programs; and performance bonuses, in which 
utilities earn financial incentives if they meet established savings targets for their efficiency 
programs (this may be combined with penalties for falling below an established minimum 
savings target) (Jensen, 2007). 
Several states in the West (California, Washington, Montana, Colorado, Idaho and 
Nevada) have adopted some form of shareholder incentives to encourage their electric utilities to 
pursue energy efficiency. In California, shareholder incentives are viewed by the investor-owned 
utilities as a very important policy driver (along with decoupling) allowing them to make a 
business case for unprecedentedly large-scale programs (PG&E, 2007; SCE, 2007). Although 
performance incentives were not adopted in California until after the most recent resource plans 
were issued (CPUC, 2007), significant ramp-up of the utilities’ energy efficiency programs for 
the 2006-08 period was in part enabled by a CPUC decision indicating it would put in place a 
shareholder incentive mechanism that would be effective during that period and going forward. 
Utility energy efficiency program managers in Nevada also assert that performance incentives 
are an important driver for their management to make energy efficiency a high priority within the 
company (Sierra Pacific Power, 2007).  
 
4.2 Climate change policies 
Some Western states and provinces have also adopted policies driven by concerns 
regarding the impacts of climate change that may indirectly encourage utilities to consider 
energy efficiency (see Table 3).9 
 
4.2.1 Carbon emission reduction goals 
California, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, British 
Columbia, and Alberta have adopted state- or province-wide carbon emission reduction goals, 
either by executive order or statute. All of the above jurisdictions except Colorado and Alberta 
are also signatories to the Western Carbon Initiative (WCI), which is in the process of 
developing a region-wide cap-and-trade program, or other market-based mechanism, to help the 
member states and provinces achieve their individual goals. Since almost all the utilities in our 
sample are subject to carbon emission reduction goals, it is difficult to draw conclusions about 
the impact of these policies on proposed energy efficiency savings.10 Moreover, with the 
                                                 
9
 While BC Hydro is technically subject to the limits set by the Kyoto protocol, which was ratified by the Canadian 
government in 2002, inaction on the part of the federal government has led the country to fall far short of fulfilling 
its obligations, and has prompted several provinces (e.g., British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec) to adopt climate 
action policies of their own. As a result, it is the provincial policies described here, and not the federal Kyoto 
obligation, that drive climate-change mitigation activities in British Columbia. 
10
 The levels of efficiency in the Oregon utilities’ resources plans are restricted by the SB1149 legislation which was 
in effect when they were completed. SB1149 fixed energy efficiency funding at the level implemented by the 
Oregon Energy Trust, and did not permit utilities to spend more. The Oregon Energy Trust was responsible for 
forecasting savings and reporting them to the utilities for inclusion in their resource plans . As a result, it is doubtful 
that the state’s carbon emission reduction goals had much bearing on the levels of energy efficiency included in the 
resource plans in our study. In 2007, new legislation (SB838) was passed, allowing the utilities to increase funding, 
so this restriction will not be binding in future resource plans. 
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exception of California, none of the states or provinces has created the regulatory authority to 
enforce them. 
 
4.2.2 Generation carbon emission performance standards 
A second GHG-mitigation policy that has been adopted by California, Washington and 
British Columbia is generation carbon emission performance standards. These jurisdictions 
prohibit their utilities from building new power plants or from signing new long-term contracts 
with plants that have carbon emission rates greater than a specified level. The U.S. states have 
set this level at the established emission rate of a new combined-cycle gas turbine. British 
Columbia’s policy goes further, requiring zero GHG emissions from new coal plants. These 
policies effectively prohibit the construction or contracting of coal plants without carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) technology. By limiting generation options for meeting demand growth, 
such policies may provide additional impetus for utilities to consider energy efficiency. 
 
4.2.3 Carbon emission mitigation requirements 
Oregon and Washington have also adopted a third type of climate change policy. As a 
condition for receiving approval to construct new power plants, these jurisdictions require that 
applicants for site permits physically offset a portion of the projected emissions. In both states, 
applicants have the choice of implementing offset projects themselves or making a payment, 
based on a specified price per ton of projected carbon emissions, to fund offset projects 
implemented by a designated entity. By increasing the cost of GHG-emitting new generation, 
carbon emission mitigation requirements increase the competitiveness of energy efficiency 
relative to other options. 
 
4.2.4 GHG emission cost adders 
The practice of including GHG emission cost adders in utility resource planning and 
procurement is also gaining popularity. In some states, (e.g., California, Idaho and Colorado), 
public utility commissions formally direct utilities to use GHG emission cost adders. In some 
cases, utilities have voluntarily included them in their resource plans (see Table 3). Inclusion of 
GHG emission cost adders should increase the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency (and 
renewable energy) relative to carbon-emitting generation resources in those jurisdictions where 
they are used. 
 
4.3 Other market drivers 
We identified two non-policy drivers that probably impact the level of energy efficiency 
proposed by utilities in the West: high forecast load growth and high retail electricity rates. 
 
4.3.1 High forecast load growth 
A number of utilities in the West, particularly in the Southwest and parts of California, 
are forecasting significant load growth over the next decade. For such utilities, higher gross 
levels of energy savings will be required to offset their incremental load growth with energy 
efficiency. This is demonstrated by the negative correlation between forecast load growth and 
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energy savings proposed in utility resource plans, expressed as a percentage of that load growth 
(see Figure 3). Although this is largely a mathematical result (the variables plotted in Figure 3 
are related), it illustrates that in order to achieve higher relative energy savings metrics, utilities 
with higher load growth need to implement more aggressive efficiency measures. 
Nonetheless, high load growth creates significant additional opportunities for energy 
efficiency, particularly in new construction markets, which should offset the above phenomenon 
to some degree. Load growth also places pressure on existing electric system infrastructure, 
potentially leading to incremental capital expenditures in new plant and transmission and 
distribution facilities, thereby increasing the avoided-capacity value of energy efficiency. These 
dynamics increase energy efficiency technical potential and cost-effectiveness. 
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Figure 3. Energy Efficiency Program Effects vs. Forecast Energy Demand Growth 
 
However, the utilities appearing along the bottom-left edge of the curve include the only 
four among our sample that did not base their proposed energy efficiency targets on estimates of 
maximum achievable potential: Nevada Power, Sierra Pacific, Tri-State, and Idaho Power. 
Moreover, SCE and SDG&E forecast load growth rates in the same range, yet their energy 
efficiency proposals are much higher. This is in part because the Inland West states have 
historically not been as active in promoting energy efficiency as the coastal regions, and current 
policies to promote energy efficiency are more limited (see Table 3 and above discussion). With 
enhanced policy support, the above-mentioned Inland West utilities could probably do more to 
capture the significant and lasting energy efficiency potential afforded by the fast pace of 
development in their service territories. 
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4.3.2 High retail electric rates 
Another potential driver is high retail electric rates. High retail energy prices enhance the 
energy efficiency value proposition from the customer’s perspective, and expand overall cost-
effective energy efficiency potential. Utilities and policymakers in jurisdictions with higher-than-
average electricity rates may also experience more pressure to minimize the impact on electric 
rates from resource investment decisions. Thus high retail electric rates may act as a driver for 
energy efficiency both directly (i.e., in utility resource plans) and indirectly (i.e., by driving the 
adoption of policies to support energy efficiency, such as were described above).  
Among the jurisdictions in our sample, Nevada and California stand out as having retail 
electric rates more than 20% above the national average (see Table 3). Figure 4 plots individual 
utilities’ ten-year energy efficiency metrics against their average retail rates. To some extent, the 
figure confirms our expectations about the expected relationship between average retail rates and 
energy efficiency savings levels. In particular, California’s three investor-owned utilities have 
the highest electric rates in our sample, and also have the highest energy efficiency targets. 
While we have already discussed a number of policies driving this result, high prices in 
California have undoubtedly contributed to the consensus required to develop such strong 
support for energy efficiency.  
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Average Retail Rate ($/kWh)
0%
4%
8%
12%
E
n
e
rg
y
 E
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 P
ro
g
ra
m
 E
ff
e
ct
s
(%
 o
f 
F
o
re
ca
st
 L
o
a
d
)
LADWP
PG&E
SCE
SDG&E
California
Pacific Northwest
Inland West
Avista
BC Hydro
PSE
Seattle City Light
Idaho Power
Nevada Power
NorthWestern
PacifiCorp
PSCo
Sierra Pacific
Tri-State
U.S. national average
 
Figure 4. Efficiency Program Effects vs. Average Retail Electricity Prices 
Sources: EIA (2006) for U.S. utility price data, BC Hydro (2006) for BC Hydro price data. 
 
However, the expected relationship between average retail rates and energy efficiency 
savings levels is not borne out for most other utilities. PSE and, to a lesser extent, BC Hydro and 
Avista’s energy efficiency proposals stand out as being extremely aggressive, despite these 
companies’ relatively low retail electricity prices. This demonstrates that energy efficiency can 
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make economic sense in regions with relatively low retail rates, while suggesting that other 
factors may drive its support. The Pacific Northwest is a somewhat unique case. With its strong 
dependence on hydropower, its system planners have historically been more concerned about 
energy rather than capacity constraints. However, the region’s hydro capacity is largely 
developed, and new generation resources (primarily natural gas and renewable plants) have 
higher capital and, in the case of gas-fired units, higher and more volatile operating costs than the 
existing fleet of resources. As a result, new generation puts upward pressure on existing retail 
rates (which are relatively low). This factor, in conjunction with the public’s desire to minimize 
the negative environmental consequences of electricity generation provide important drivers for 
strong public policy support for energy efficiency in this region. 
The bottom line is that, although retail rates can be a driver for energy efficiency, high 
electricity prices are not necessary to make the business case for efficiency, and in isolation do 
not make a good predictor of energy efficiency activity. 
 
5. Achieving 20% efficiency gains across the West 
In 2004, the Western Governors’ Association (WGA), recognizing the need for a 
coordinated energy policy among its member states, formed the Clean and Diversified Energy 
Advisory Committee (CDEAC) to investigate clean energy options and develop consensus on a 
Clean and Diversified Energy initiative (CDEi) for the West. This process resulted in a series of 
resolutions, including a voluntary goal of improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 (WGA, 
2004). This goal is premised on West-wide implementation of a set of best practices and 
strategies covering ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, federal and state appliance 
energy efficiency standards, and energy efficiency provisions in state building codes (WGA 
CDEAC, 2006). It applies to all the utilities in our study except BC Hydro. 
CDEAC’s first progress report identified qualitative achievements toward this goal, 
focusing on policies adopted and programs initiated and funded among the Western states in the 
first years since the goal was adopted (WGA CDEAC, 2007). However, the report included no 
quantitative metric of actual progress, citing difficulties in measuring energy efficiency impacts. 
Utility resource plans, including as they do long-term load and resource data, could be a 
relatively accessible source of quantitative information to measure intended progress toward the 
CDEi goal. Although the energy efficiency proposals in the resource plans do not represent 
concrete commitments, they can serve as a basis to determine how close the proposals would 
come to meeting the goal, if implemented. 
However, the current resource plans provide only partial information to answer this 
question because they only specify savings from ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, 
and not from state or federal appliance efficiency standards or energy efficiency provisions in 
state building codes that could count toward the CDEi goal.11  
Acknowledging these shortcomings, we report the energy efficiency program data that 
were available in the resource plans as a proportion of TER in 2020, using 2006 as the starting 
point for counting efficiency measures (see Table 4).12 This provides insight into the contribution 
                                                 
11
 Moreover, the methods used to account for standards, codes and naturally occurring energy efficiency in utilities’ 
load forecasts are typically not documented in the resource plans, so it is unclear whether the published load 
forecasts include energy savings from these sources. 
12
 Energy efficiency measures implemented prior to 2006 may not be counted toward the CDEi goal; however, 
energy efficiency policies and programs authorized prior to 2006 but whose measures were implemented in 2006 or 
later are acceptable. 
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of ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, as currently envisioned by utilities, in meeting 
the CDEi goal of meeting 20% of energy requirements with energy efficiency by 2020. 
The California investor-owned utilities (PG&E, SCE and SDG&E), along with PGE and 
PSE in the Pacific Northwest, are poised to achieve more than half of the WGA goal (i.e., at least 
10% reduction in energy use) in their service territories if they implement the energy efficiency 
programs proposed in their resource plans. BC Hydro would also be in this category, even 
though as a Canadian utility it is not subject to the CDEi goal. 
The remaining coastal utilities (LADWP, Avista and Seattle City Light), along with 
Northwestern, PacifiCorp and PSCo, are expected to meet between 7% and 10% of energy 
requirements if they implement all the efficiency in their resource plans. The utilities in Idaho 
and Nevada, along with Tri-state, can be expected to meet less than 6% of energy requirements 
with the level of savings from energy-efficiency programs included in their current resource 
plans. 
 
Table 4. Utilities’ Progress toward the WGA CDEi Energy Efficiency Goal 
Utility Savings from proposed energy efficiency programs in 2020 
(% of TER1) 
CALIFORNIA  
LADWP2 8.4% 
PG&E2 12.9% 
SCE2 11.0% 
SDG&E2 15.3% 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST  
Avista 7.9% 
BC Hydro 11.3% 
PGE2 10.0% 
PSE 13.7% 
Seattle City Light 8.3% 
INLAND WEST  
Idaho Power 5.6% 
Nevada Power 3.9% 
Northwestern 8.8% 
PacifiCorp 7.1% 
PSCo2 7.6% 
Sierra Pacific 5.6% 
Tri-State 4.8% 
1TER (Total Energy Requirements) = forecasted energy demand, not accounting for the effects of energy efficiency programs 
proposed for implementation over the planning period.  
2The resource plan did not propose savings to 2020; the reported value was calculated assuming energy efficiency programs would 
continue at same level as the last year for which energy efficiency programs were proposed in the resource plan. 
 
Ultimately, the ability of each state to meet the CDEi goal depends both on the 
contribution from energy efficiency programs, as well as the scope and enforcement of appliance 
and equipment standards and building codes. The Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
(NPCC) tracks and reports the relative contributions of energy efficiency programs, codes and 
standards across the Pacific Northwest states. This analysis of historical energy efficiency 
measures provides an indication of the relative contributions of each of these energy efficiency 
strategies in the Northwest (see Figure 5). As of 2006, energy efficiency programs administered 
by the region’s utilities, Bonneville Power Administration (a federal electricity wholesaler), and 
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the Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance accounted for 60% of regional energy efficiency 
resources. State codes and federal appliance efficiency standards each provided 20% of regional 
savings. 
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Figure 5. Energy Efficiency Resources in the Pacific Northwest: 1990–2006 
Source: NPCC (2008) 
 
Going forward, federal standards adopted in the recent Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) will likely increase the relative contribution of and savings from federal 
energy efficiency standards for appliances and equipment.13 The relative role of and savings 
from state building codes and standards in other parts of the West depends primarily on the 
amount of new construction, the efficiency levels embedded in building codes or standards, and 
the extent to which builders actually comply with the energy efficiency standards in new 
construction. Nonetheless the Pacific Northwest example (Figure 5) suggests that if at least 60% 
of the WGA goal (i.e., 12%, should be achieved by utility programs), then the coastal IOUs are 
mostly on track but the inland utilities and LADWP fall short.14  
Many parts of the West lack a regional agency such as the NPCC or a state energy office 
with the analytical capabilities to track the effects of standards and codes. Given this reality, a 
more complete picture of energy efficiency resource shares across the West going forward would 
be possible if utilities in such jurisdictions adopted the practice of accounting for standards and 
codes explicitly in their resource plans.15 Hopper et al. (2006) provide concrete recommendations 
to assist utilities to do so. 
                                                 
13
 The new law introduces energy efficiency standards for twelve types of appliances and equipment, and also 
mandates significant improvements in incandescent lighting (common light bulbs are to use 20% less energy than 
current incandescent bulbs by 2012, and 30% less by 2014). 
14
 Savings of 12% from energy efficiency programs should be sufficient to meet the WGA goal where there is strong 
support for codes and standards. In areas (such as the Inland West) with less contribution from these other sources, 
utility energy efficiency programs may need to make up a larger portion of savings to meet the WGA goal. 
15
 Utilities typically account for the effects of standards and codes in their load forecasts through some combination 
of end-use and econometric analysis techniques. Reporting these assumed savings levels in their resource plan 
documents would represent relatively little incremental effort on the utilities’ part while providing useful 
information to state agencies and regulators, and the public. 
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6. Conclusions 
This survey of recent utility resource plans reveals a significant and growing commitment 
to energy efficiency as a resource in the West, even in states that have placed less emphasis on 
ratepayer-funded energy efficiency in recent years (e.g., Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Montana). 
This is occurring despite the absence of federal climate change leadership, as states and 
provinces are stepping up with their own policies in support of energy efficiency and GHG 
emission mitigation. 
Utility resource planning provides a framework and a forum for evaluating energy 
efficiency resource potential and for helping ensure that it is given appropriate priority in 
resource acquisition decisions. The process of resource planning is spreading—a number of 
states have recently passed or updated state statutes or regulatory decisions that require utilities 
to prepare and file integrated resource plans, both in the West (e.g., New Mexico, Wyoming) and 
the Mid-West (e.g., Missouri). 
However, resource planning in itself is not sufficient to ensure that socially optimal levels 
of energy efficiency resources will be pursued by utilities. This study has demonstrated that, 
among utilities currently performing resource planning, commitments to energy efficiency vary 
considerably, with the most aggressive plans in California and parts of the Pacific Northwest, 
and less aggressive proposals in the Inland West, where utilities and policymakers have had less 
experience implementing ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs in recent years. 
Although it is difficult to disentangle the impacts of the numerous policy instruments and 
market drivers on the proposed levels of energy efficiency, a few trends do emerge. The adoption 
of multiple, aggressive policies targeting energy efficiency and climate change does appear to 
produce sizeable energy efficiency commitments (e.g., the California investor-owned utilities, 
PSE, Avista, PSCo). In some cases, setting specific targets—such as the CPUC’s mandated goals 
for investor-owned utilities and Nevada’s RPS provisions—dictate directly the amount of energy 
savings included in utilities’ portfolios. Other policies, such as revenue decoupling and 
shareholder incentives, may be a necessary prerequisite for developing support for energy 
efficiency among utility managers and shareholders. And GHG emission reduction policies may 
also have an impact—albeit not easily measured—by enhancing the cost-effectiveness of energy 
efficiency relative to other resource options, or more generally signaling the high priority 
attached to environmental impacts. 
Despite the progress made by the utilities in our sample, our analysis suggests that much 
work needs to be done to achieve the WGA CDEi goal of meeting 20% of electricity demand 
with efficiency in 2020. New federal appliance efficiency standards will help, but individual 
states will still need to significantly enhance their efforts to encourage additional utility program 
investment, and adopt and enforce state appliance standards and energy efficiency provisions in 
building codes along current best practices. For the Inland West states, high load growth affords 
significant, lasting energy savings opportunities that can help them meet this goal, but action is 
needed to capture these one-time opportunities before they are lost. 
Going forward, we expect to see continued growth in the importance of energy efficiency 
in the West, as demand continues to grow, environmental concerns mount, and constraints on 
supply-side options continue to bind. The adoption of a federal climate change policy, if 
sufficiently aggressive, could also provide further impetus for energy efficiency investment. 
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